Footnote 3:

One might try the following move. In our world, selection is based on existence. Organisms are selected to exist. But perhaps selection sufficient for mindedness could be defined in terms of any marker of organisms. Thus, in w2 the organisms are selected to be born on earth. That's a locational selection. And maybe that's enough for teleology, etc. (Imagine a sheep breeder who instead of not breeding the disprefered sheep, simply gifts it to another farmer who is not so picky.) But if locational, rather than existential, selection is enough to yield teleology, etc., then selection for any property should be enough. And then we have a multiplicity of new teleological facts, and we need a story about how the different teleological facts (those about selection for existence, those about selection for red dots on foreheads, etc.) interact, and which ones are relevant to mindedness. That's going to be a big nasty mess.

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